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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
THE AVAILABILITY OF STATE CAUSES OF
ACTION FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF
NONSEAMEN KILLED IN TERRITORIAL
WATERS: YAMAHA MOTOR CORP. V. CALHOUN
At one point in our culture, most accidents and deaths in state territorial
waters' involved people that made their living working on the seas.2 As our
society has developed and become more mobile, however, coastal areas and
their territorial waters have become "hotspots" for vacationers looking for
sun, sand, and surf. With the drastic increase in the number of people who
play in and on our nation's territorial waters, the number of nonseamen killed
has risen dramatically. Until recently, however, the legal status of state and
federal wrongful death and survival actions3 in such situations remained
uncertain.'
In these situations, courts have struggled to balance the competing
1. "'State territorial waters' refers to waters within the territorial limits of a state, as well as 'the
coastal waters less than three nautical miles from the shore of a state."' Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor
Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 624 n. I (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting William C. Brown I, Problems Arising from the
Intersection of Traditional Maritime Law and Aviation Death and Personal Injury, 68 TUL. L. REV.
577, 581 (1994)), af'd, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
2. Most of these people receive protection for accidents that occur in territorial waters from
federal statutes. Most seamen receive protection from the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994). The
Jones Act, passed as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 1007, extends to seamen the
same protections as the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994), and
grants to seamen a personal injury and wrongful death remedy for the negligence of their employers.
The Jones Act limits recoverable damages to pecuniary losses. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498
U.S. 19, 32 (1990).
Most longshore workers are covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-942 (1994), which gives them the right to receive workers'
compensation benefits from their employers for accidental death or injury arising out of employment.
The LHWCA "preempted state compensation statutes and provided a uniform remedy to the land-
based maritime employee." Petitioner's Brief at 20, Calhoun, 116 S. Ct 619 (1996) (No. 94-1387),
available in 1995 WL 451711.
3. Throughout this article, for economy, I use the term wrongful death to include survival
actions and remedies.
4. "Prior to 1996, no Supreme Court case had confronted the issue before the Choat court: what
damages are available, and under what law, where the deceased is not a maritime worker and where
the death occurs in a state's territorial waters?" David F. Walker, Recent Decision, Choat v. Kawasaki
Motors Corp.: The Alabama Supreme Court's Journey Through the Murky Waters of Maritime
Wrongul Death Remedies, 47 ALA. L. REV. 929, 947 (1996).
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interests of federal maritime law5 and the law of the state where the accident
occured.6 While state law generally governs lawsuits arising out of incidents
occurring in that state and its territorial waters, the substantive law that
governs maritime torts is the general maritime law.7 The general maritime law
is a form of federal common law that is independent of any state common
law.8 In the recent case of Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun,9 however, the
Supreme Court held that state law remedies remain applicable in wrongful
death" and survival actions" arising from accidents to nonseamen"2 in
5. It may be helpful at this point to define some basic terms of maritime law. "The term
.maritime' refers to the sea and other navigable waters." Gary Mayes, Maritime Torts, in I Mo. TORT
LAW, § 15-2 (MoBar 2d ed. 1990) (citing I STEvEN F. FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 103
(7th ed. 1988)). "'Maritime law' is the substantive law that defines and regulates maritime conduct."
Id. (citing Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 518, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1967)).
"'Admiralty' refers to specialized tribunals and practice in litigation." Id. (citing 1 FRIEDELL, supra, §
102). "In short, the term 'admiralty' refers to special courts, their practice, procedure and jurisdiction
while 'maritime law' refers to a body of substantive law applicable to maritime matters." Id.
6. Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that "[tihe judicial Power [of
the United States] shall extend.., to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Further, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that federal district courts "shall also
have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Act of
1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994)). However, the Act
also contained the famous saving-to-suitors clause: "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of common
law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." Id. Thus, "Congress vested the whole of
original admiralty jurisdiction in the federal district courts, along with all of the procedures and
remedies unique to that jurisdiction." Mayes, supra note 5, § 15-4. However, while state courts have
no admiralty jurisdiction, they do have "concurrent jurisdiction over certain matters reserved to them
by the 'saving-to-suitors' clause." Id
7. Under the rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), state law applies to federal
diversity suits. That is not the case with federal admiralty suits. Federal admiralty suits are governed
by federal common law known as maritime law. Sun world Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801
F.2d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 1986); Mayes, supra note 5, § 15-8.
8. Generally, "state law may not be applied by a federal court if it would defeat or narrow any
substantive admiralty rights of recovery created by federal statute or by case law." Mayes, supra note
5, § 15-11 (citing Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953)). However, see Romero v.
International Terminal Operating, 358 U.S. 354 (1959), stating:
Although the corpus of admiralty law is federal in the sense that it derives from the implications of
Article I evolved by the courts, to claim that all enforced rights pertaining to matters maritime are
rooted in federal law is a destructive oversimplification of the highly intricate interplay of the States
and the National Government.
Id. at 373-75; see also American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 452 (1994) (reaffirming the
above-stated principle from Romero).
9. 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
10. In Calhoun, the Third Circuit described wrongful death actions:
A wrongful death cause of action belongs to the decedent's dependents (or, in the case of the death
of a minor, to the decedent's closest kin). It allows the beneficiaries to recover for harm that they
personally suffered as a result of the death, and it is totally independent of any cause of action the
decedent may have had for his or her own personal injuries. Damages are determined by what
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territorial waters, despite an earlier recognition of a federal maritime wrongful
death cause of action. 3
Part I of this Recent Development briefly canvasses the development of
maritime law as it relates to this controversy. It looks at more recent maritime
cases that give context to this controversy and provide arguments both for and
against the availability of state law causes of action for federal maritime
cases. Part II describes the facts and procedural background of Yamaha Motor
Corp. v. Calhoun, which provides a classic opportunity for discussion of this
controversy. Part III discusses the Supreme Court's analysis in Yamaha
Motor Corp v. Calhoun. Finally, Part IV discusses the future implications of
the decision.
I. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT MARITIME LAW
In The Harrisburg4 the Supreme Court held that the general maritime
law, in the absence of any applicable statute, did not include a cause of action
for wrongful death. 5 In that case, the Court concluded that the common law
did not recognize a cause of action for wrongful death and wrongful death
actions could only be created by statute.'6 Despite the obvious shortcomings
beneficiaries would have "received" from decedent, and can include recovery for pecuniary losses
like most monetary support, and for non-pecuniary losses like loss of society.
Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 637 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
11. Even though a survival action is normally brought by the deceased's survivors acting in a
representative capacity, a survival action belongs to the deceased's estate and permits recovery for
injuries suffered by the deceased that caused death. "Under a survival action, the decedent's
representative recovers for the decedent's pain and suffering, medical expenses, lost earnings (both
past and future), and funeral expenses." Id.
12. "Nonseamen" refers to "persons who are neither seamen covered by the Jones Act, ... nor
longshore workers covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act." Calhoun, 116
S. Ct. at 623 n.2.
13. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970); see infra notes 25-31 and
accompanying text.
14. 119 U.S. 199(1886).
15. Id. at213.
16. The Supreme Court reasoned:
Since, however, it is now established that in the courts of the United States no action at law can be
maintained for such a wrong in the absence of a statute giving the right, and it has not been shown
that the maritime law, as accepted and received by maritime nations generally, has established a
different rule for the government of the courts of admiralty from those which govern courts of law
in matters of this kind, we are forced to the conclusion that no such action will lie in the courts of
the United States under the general maritime law.
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of this decision, t7 it remained the law for nearly a century.
Spurred on by the inequities caused by the decision, both Congress and
the lower courts reacted in a way that mitigated the harshness of the Supreme
Court's holding in The Harrisburg. Congress reacted by implementing two
statutes, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) and the Jones Act, which
were designed to protect groups of people likely to be injured on the sea.
DOHSA created a wrongful death cause of action for the beneficiaries of all
persons, seamen, and nonseamen, killed on the high seas. 8 The Jones Act
created a wrongful death cause of action for the beneficiaries of seamen who
were killed in the course of employment, whether they were killed on the
high seas or in territorial waters.'9
Although these statutes provided a remedy for many situations, they did
not create a wrongful death cause of action for nonseamen killed in territorial
waters.2" Lower courts dealt with this lack of protection by allowing recovery
for deaths within state territorial waters where the state had an applicable
wrongful death statute.2 Thus, through a patchwork of separate federal
statutes and a willingness to use state law22 to supplement the general federal
maritime law in situations involving deaths of nonseamen in territorial waters,
17. This decision was criticized heavily both before and after it was overruled in Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). Criticism was focused on both the fact that "It]he
Court did not question the soundness of this view [that wrongful death actions could only be created
by statute], or examine the historical justifications that account for it," Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 624, and
for the lack of uniformity it eventually produced by providing an inconsistent patchwork of wrongful
death recovery. See Thomas Pollard Diaz, Comment, Maritime Wrongful Death: A Riptide Develops
offthe United States Coast, 62 TUL. L. REV. 597, 601 (1988).
18. The DOHSA "provided a remedy to the beneficiaries of any person killed as a result of
'wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league [three nautical
miles] from shore of any State."' Diaz, supra note 17, at 597-98 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 761
(1994)). Recovery under the DOHSA can be predicated on the doctrine of unseaworthiness, which has
become a form of strict liability, but damages are limited to pecuniary losses. See Calhoun, 116 S. Ct.
at 625.
19. "The Jones Act, which incorporates the provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA), confers to the personal representatives of a deceased seamen a wrongful death and survival
action predicated on an employer's negligence." Diaz, supra note 17, at 599-600 (internal citations
omitted).
20. See id. at 600.
21. See Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 624; Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 212
(1986); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921); see also Diaz, supra note 17, at 600
("Under these circumstances, the general maritime law 'borrowed' state wrongful death and survival
statutes, allowing state law 'to determine when recovery shall be permitted and when it shall not."'
(quoting The Tungus v. Skougaard, 358 U.S. 588, 594 (1959))).
22. All fifty states have wrongful death statutes. See generally 22A AM. JUR. 2d Death § 7
(1988).
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most people were ensured of a wrongful death remedy for maritime
accidents. 23
Although most people were ensured of some sort of a wrongful death
remedy, this system of recovery was not viewed as entirely acceptable due to
the inconsistencies that had developed as a result of the three different
avenues of recovery. 4 Therefore, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines," the
Supreme Court overruled The Harrisburg and held that the general maritime
law provided a wrongful death cause of action.26 The Supreme Court's
decision in Moragne was driven by an attempt to correct the inequities that
had resulted from the inconsistent framework of wrongful death recovery.27
Of paramount importance was the disparity created when the doctrine of
23. See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 1994), ajfd, 116 S. Ct. 619
(1996), stating:
These developments, particularly the enactment of DOHSA and the Jones Act, ensured that a
wrongful death remedy would be available for most people killed in maritime accidents. Thus,
between 1920 and 1970, deaths on the high seas were remedied by DOHSA, deaths in territorial
waters were remedied by state wrongful death statutes, and deaths of seamen (whether on the high
seas or in territorial waters) were remedied by the Jones Act.
Id. at 631.
24. See, for example, Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 631, stating that "The Harrisburg, however, remained
troublesome. Part of the trouble stemmed from the development of different theories of recovery for
maritime deaths." See also Diaz, supra note 17, at 601 ("In effect, the legislative and judicial attempts
to ameliorate the impact of The Harrisburg ... wove a tapestry of recovery that contained three
discernable anomalies.").
25. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). Moragne involved a wrongful death and survival lawsuit brought by
the widow of a longshore worker who was killed in Florida's territorial waters. Id. at 376. Mrs.
Moragne alleged both unseaworthiness and negligence, but the district court dismissed the claim for
unseaworthiness because Florida's wrongful death statute did not include unseaworthiness as a basis of
liability. Id. After the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the unseaworthiness claim, the
Supreme Court overruled The Harrisburg, stating that The Harrisburg's holding, "somewhat dubious
even when rendered, is such an unjustifiable anomaly in the present maritime law that it should no
longer be followed." Id at 378.
26. Id. at 409 (stating that "[w]e accordingly overrule The Harrisburg, and hold that an action
does lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties.").
27. The Moragne Court agreed with the statement of the United States, participating as amicus
curiae, that continuing to follow the existing framework "would perpetuate three anomalies of present
law." Id. at 375. First, the Court pointed out that, as the law presently stood, "within territorial waters,
identical conduct violating federal law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces
liability if the victim is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed." Id. Second, the Court found
that "identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in death, produce liability
outside the three-mile limit ... but not within the territorial waters of a State whose local statute
excludes unseaworthiness claims." Id. The third "anomaly" that the Court noted was "that a true
seaman [one who is covered by the Jones Act] .. . is provided no remedy for death caused by
unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman, to whom the duty of seaworthiness
was extended only because he performs work traditionally done by seamen, does have such a remedy
when allowed by a state statute." Id at 395-96.
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unseaworthiness, which was available to plaintiffs in DOHSA cases but was
generally not available to plaintiffs in state wrongful death cases,2 8 was
transformed into a species of strict liability.29 As a result, plaintiffs who could
allege the doctrine of unseaworthiness" were entitled to proceed under a strict
liability theory, while those who could not allege the doctrine of
unseaworthiness faced the much more burdensome task of having to prove
negligence. By recognizing a wrongful death cause of action in the general
maritime law, Moragne remedied this situation and signaled an attempt to
provide more uniformity in the maritime law."
Several other important cases followed Moragne.2 In Sea-Land Services,
Inc. v. Gaudet,33 the Supreme Court held that the newly recognized general
maritime wrongful death cause of action allowed for recovery of loss of
society damages.34 In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,35 the Supreme Court
held that survivors of a person killed on the high seas could not recover
damages under the general maritime law in addition to the damages available
28. Some state wrongful death statutes allowed a plaintiff to recover under the doctrine of
unseaworthiness, while some did not. See Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 632 (citing The Tungus v. Skovgaurd,
358 U.S. 588 (1959), for the proposition that New Jersey allows wrongful death actions based on the
doctrine ofunseaworthiness, and Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 211 So. 2d 161, 166 (Fla. 1968), for
the proposition that Florida does not allow wrongful death actions based on the doctrine of
unseaworthiness.)
29. See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 624 (1996) ("State wrongful death
statutes proved an adequate supplement to federal maritime law, until a series of this Court's decisions
transformed the maritime doctrine ofunseaworthiness into a strict liability rule.").
30. Either because ofDOHSA or because the state wrongful death statute allowed recovery under
the doctrine of unseaworthiness. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
3 1. The Court explained:
Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure
uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted
from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive
concepts. Such uniformity not only will further the concerns of both of the 1920 Acts but also will
give effect to the constitutionally based principle that federal admiralty law should be "a system of
law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country."
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 401-02 (quoting The Lottawanna, 88 U.S.) (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1875))
(citations and footnote omitted).
32. "Four Supreme Court cases following Moragne are generally cited as adding to the Moragne
definition of the general maritime wrongful death cause of action." Walker, supra note 4, at 946.
33. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
34. Gaudet allowed the family members of a longshoreman who was killed in territorial waters to
collect non-pecuniary loss of society damages, thus recognizing that the general maritime wrongful
death cause of action allowed for this type of recovery despite the fact that the DOHSA wrongful death
cause of action did not. Id.
35. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
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under DOHSA.36 Similarly, in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire37 the
Supreme Court held that survivors of persons killed on the high seas could
not recover damages under state law in addition to the damages available
under DOHSA.3 8 Finally, in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.39 the Supreme Court
held that the damages provided for under the Jones Act4 were the exclusive
remedy available to a Jones Act seaman, and that those damages could not be
supplemented by a claim based on the general maritime wrongful death
action recognized in Moragne4 Along with Moragne, these decisions were
often cited as giving considerable support to the view that uniformity had
become a guiding principle in interpreting maritime law.42
Although these opinions began to outline the contours of the federal
general maritime wrongful death cause of action, no Supreme Court case had
determined whether state causes of action were still available for the deaths of
nonseamen killed in state territorial waters following the holding in Moragne.
Many courts interpreted the recognition of a federal general maritime
wrongful death cause of action in Moragne as replacing the application of
state law to these situations.43 They argued that because federal general
36. The Court found that Congress had expressly answered the question as to what kinds of
damages were available for wrongful death on the high seas and that they were not free to supplement
those damages. Id. at 626.
Although this decision was, at least on the surface, supported by the desire to make the general
federal maritime law consistent with Congress's directives for federal maritime law under DOHSA, it
is notable that it created an inconsistency. As the Third Circuit noted, "Higginbotham, for example,
quite consciously created an anomaly (the unavailability of non-pecuniary damages for wrongful death
at high sea where such damages were available to longshoremen killed in territorial waters), stating
that 'a desire for uniformity cannot override the statute [DOHSA]."' Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp.,
40 F.3d 622, 636 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624) (alteration by Higginbotham
Court), aft'd, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
37. 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
38. Not surprisingly, the Court's analysis in Tallendre differed little from its analysis in
Higginbotham: Congress had expressly provided what damages were to be available for deaths on the
high seas, and the Court did not feel free to supplement them. Id. 231-32.
39. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
40. The damages available under the Jones Act for wrongful death are limited to damages for
pecuniary loss. See supra note 2. Thus, there is no recovery for damages such as loss of society under
the Jones Act. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 32.
41. The Miles Court viewed this decision as remedying "an anomaly we created in
Higginbotham." 498 U.S. at 33. The Court stated that "[t]oday we restore a uniform rule applicable to
all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or general
maritime law." Id
42. See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 636 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that "the
notion that Moragne initiated a trend in the case law to make recovery for maritime deaths more
uniform ... permeates the rhetoric of the case law"), a]f'd, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
43. In Wahistrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit
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maritime law now provided a remedy for the wrongful death of nonseamen in
territorial waters, there no longer was a need for a state remedy. This
conclusion was bolstered by an interpretation of Moragne and its progeny
that treated uniformity as a guiding principle.' Clearly, uniformity would be
served by making the federal remedy exclusive, and it would be hindered by
supplementing the federal remedy with a state remedy that would vary
depending on the wrongful death statutes of the particular state involved.
Despite the recognition of a federal remedy and the concern for
uniformity, good arguments still existed for the application of state law.45
Before Moragne, state wrongful death statutes routinely supplemented federal
general maritime law in cases involving the death of nonseamen in territorial
waters.46 Moragne did not dictate that this change.47 Since Moragne, the
Supreme Court had consistently permitted state laws to supplement the
federal general maritime law in other areas.4" Additionally, Congress, through
DOHSA, had expiessly left deaths in territorial waters governed by the
states.49 Finally, there was a feeling that the Supreme Court's reliance on
uniformity in the general maritime law was not nearly as important as the
language in their decisions indicated. 0 Several courts recognized these and
recognized the importance of uniformity in the maritime law and held that the recognition of a federal
general maritime wrongful death cause of action in Moragne necessarily precluded the application of
differing individual state wrongful death statutes to actions for wrongful death and survival occurring
in territorial waters that fall under federal admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 1089.
Also see, for example, Petitioner's Brief at 26, Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996) (No. 94-1387),
available in 1995 WL 451711, stating that "[o]ther courts addressing the question of substantive law
applicable to deaths involving recreational boats on state waters have uniformly applied the Moragne
remedy." Yamaha's brief cited several cases for this proposition, including Kelly v. Panama Canal
Commission, 26 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1994) (recreational boating accident on Panama Canal), and Walker
v. Braus, 995 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1993) (recreational boating collision on state inland waterway).
44. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
45. For a more detailed discussion of these arguments, see Walker, supra note 4, at 947-54.
46. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
47. At least one scholar has even suggested that "the language of Moragne indicates the Court's
intent that state law continue to apply in territorial waters." Walker, supra note 4, at 950.
48. See id. at 947-48.
49. Section 1 of DO1SA provides that it only applies on the high seas more than three nautical
miles, "a marine league," from shore. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1994). Section 7 of DOHSA states that
"[the provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall
not be affected by this chapter. Nor shall this chapter apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within
the territorial limits of any State." Id. § 767; see also Walker, supra note 4, at 949 (stating that "[t]he
legislative history of the DOHSA clearly indicates a congressional intent to defer to state law with
regard to territorial waters").
50. See Diaz, supra note 17, at 605-11; see also Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622,
636 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that "[a] second trend is the weakness with which the principle of
uniformity, . . . has actually been applied in these cases. For, although the cases often mention
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other factors as persuasive and held that, even after Moragne, state wrongful
death statutes were available to supplement the federal general maritime
law.5 Until Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, however, the Supreme Court
had yet to decide this issue.
II. BACKGROUND: YAMAHA MOTOR CORP. V. CALHOUN
While on vacation at a beach-front resort in Puerto Rico with family
friends, twelve-year-old Nancy Calhoun was killed when the Yamaha jet ski
she was riding 2 crashed into the side of a boat that was anchored off the
coast" Nancy Calhoun's parents, Lucien and Robin Calhoun, sued Yamahae4
in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania5 under
Pennsylvania's wrongful death 56 and survival57 statutes.51 The suit sought
damages for lost future earnings, loss of society, loss of support and services,
funeral expenses, and punitive damages.59
Yamaha, however, moved for partial summary judgment arguing that the
federal general maritime wrongful death cause of action recognized in
Moragne was the exclusive basis for recovery, precluding all state law
remedies.' The only damages recoverable under the federal general maritime
uniformity as a guiding principle, the Court's actions belie its importance"), afd, 116 S. Ct. 619
(1996).
51. See Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 641 n.37, stating that "[a]lthough Yamaha has been able to muster
considerable support in the case law for its position that Moragne displaces all state wrongful death
statutes, the case law appears to be split on this issue." The Third Circuit cited to several cases for this
proposition, including Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., 984 F.2d 1270, 1280 n.12 (1st Cir. 1983)
("Even today, plaintiffs may invoke state wrongful death statutes under the saving clause insofar as
they involve accidents in territorial waters and do not conflict with the substantive principles
developed under the maritime wrongful death doctrine."), and Lyon v. Ranger III, 858 F.2d 22, 27 (1st
Cir. 1988) (applying Massachusetts state law in a wrongful death action arising from a scuba diving
accident in Massachusetts' territorial waters).
52. Nancy Calhoun was riding a rented "Wavejammer" jet ski. The "Wavejammer" was
manufactured by Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. and its parent company, Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd.
Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 622.
53. Id.
54. Lucien and Robin Calhoun sued both individually and in their representative capacities as
administrators for the estate of their deceased daughter. Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 625.
55. "Their complaint invoked federal jurisdiction both on the basis of diversity of citizenship ...
and admiralty." Id. (citations omitted).
56. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (1982 & Supp. 1996).
57. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (1982).
58. "The theories of recovery alleged in the complaint included negligence, strict liability, and
breach of the implied warranties of merchantibility and fitness for purpose." Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 625.
59. Id.
60. Calhoun, 116S. Ct. at622.
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cause of action, Yamaha argued, were funeral expenses.6' The district court
agreed with Yamaha and found that the federal general maritime wrongful
death action recognized in Moragne precluded the application of state
wrongful death statutes.62 The court, however, found that both loss of society
and loss of support and services were compensable under the Moragne cause
of action.63 Both sides appealed.64
The Third Circuit Court, however, did not reach the issues certified for
appeal.6' Instead, the court of appeals "determined that an anterior issue was
pivotal"'  and focused on whether the district court's finding that the federal
general maritime wrongful death action precluded application of state
wrongful death statutes was correct 67
The Third Circuit first determined that admiralty jurisdiction was
appropriate and, therefore, that the proper law to govern the dispute was the
substantive admiralty law.68 The court then noted that although most of the
substantive admiralty law is federal, it is often supplemented by state law.69
After determining that state law may supplement federal maritime law if it
does not conflict with the substantive principles of federal maritime law,7" the
court admitted that the question whether federal maritime law conflicts with
state law is "extremely tricky."'" Noting that there is a presumption against
preemption in admiralty cases,72 the court proceeded to determine the issue73
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The questions certified for appeal were '"whether, pursuant to such a maritime cause of
action [(Moragne wrongful death)], plaintiffs may seek to recover (1) damages for the loss of the
society of their deceased minor child, (2) damages for the loss of their child's future earnings, and (3)
punitive damages."' Id. (quoting district court's certification order).
65. The Third Circuit found that "the answer to the certified question depends in large part on the
resolution of the displacement question.... The displacement question, which, in our view, is the
critical question raised by this appeal, is therefore appropriately before use, and we turn immediately to
it." Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 626.
66. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at622.
67. Id. at 623.
68. "The Supreme Court has instructed us that '[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the
application of substantive admiralty law."' Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 626-27 (quoting East River S.S. Corp.
v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986)).
69. Id. at 627 ('Although the corpus of admiralty law is federal' ... state law can, and often
does, provide the relevant rule of decision in admiralty cases.") (quoting Romero v. International
Terminal Operating, 358 U.S. 354,373-74 (1959)).
70. "Whether a state law may provide a rule of decision in an admiralty case depends on whether
the state rule 'conflicts' with the substantive principles of admiralty law." Id.
71. Ia at 628.
72. "[N]on-maritime cases employ a presumption against preemption.... In admiralty law a
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through a review of the development of the relevant maritime law. The court
noted two trends in maritime law: (1) a reduction in the rights of plaintiffs74
and (2) the "weakness with which the principle of uniformity" was
followed." After minimizing the importance of uniformity concerns, the
court then distinguished the uniformity concerns in Tallentire, Higginbotham,
and Miles as different from those in the present case.76 Taking all these
considerations into account, the Third Circuit held that the "general maritime
law does not preempt state law wrongful death acts in actions based on the
death of a nonseaman in territorial waters. 77
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court first established that maritime jurisdiction was proper
in this case,7" but noted that "prior to Moragne, federal admiralty courts
routinely applied state wrongful death and survival statutes in maritime
accident cases."'79 The Supreme Court then stated the issue in this case as
"whether Moragne should be read to stop that practice."
80
The Supreme Court next proceeded to review the history of the relevant
similar presumption is incorporated in the case law by the requirement that there be a 'clear conflict'
before state laws are preempted." Id. at 630. For a more detailed discussion of the presumption against
preemption in the Calhoun case, see Peter Thompson, State Courts and State Law: A New Force in
Admiralty?, 8 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 223,237-39 (1996).
73. At this point in its analysis, the court framed the issue as follows: "whether state statutory
remedies can provide the rule of decision when a recreational boater is killed in territorial waters
largely reduces to an inquiry into whether the different substantive admiralty rules articulated in
federal statutes and at common law would be frustrated by the application of state law." Calhoun, 40
F.3d at 630.
74. "One trend that cannot be ignored is that the Court seems to be cutting back on plaintiffs'
rights in maritime actions." Id. at 636.
75. "A second trend is the weakness with which the principle of uniformity-which permeates
the rhetoric of the case law-has actually been applied in these cases." Id.
76. The court stated that unlike the situations in those cases, "each of which implicated clearly
articulated federal statutory schemes, the Moragne cause of action in this context reflects anything but
a clearly articulated scheme. Not only has Congress said nothing about the applicability of particular
remedies, but the Court's common law has not either." Id. at 641.
77. Id. at 644.
78. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 623 (1996) ('"With admiralty jurisdiction,'
we have often said, 'comes the application of substantive admiralty law.' The exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction, however, 'does not result in automatic displacement of state law."' (quoting East River
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986), and Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock, 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1046 (1995))).
79. Id. at 623-24.
80. Id. at 624.
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maritime law.8 The Court focused on the rule of The Harrisburg,82 the three
anomalies it produced in the maritime law, 3 and the reasons for its reversal in
Moragne.8 The Court then considered Yamaha's argument that the federal
general maritime wrongful death cause of action recognized in Moragne
preempted the application of state remedies85 and undertook a three-step
analysis of the dispute in this case.86
First, the Court distinguished between uniformity concerns dealing with
liability issues and uniformity concerns dealing with remedial issues.8 7 The
Court stressed that the three anomalies created by The Harrisburg that could
no longer be tolerated in Moragne all involved differing standards of
liability.88 The most important of these was the difference in liability created
by the disparity between the standard of liability for unseaworthiness and
negligence. 89 Unlike the anomalies that led to the decision in Moragne,
however, this case only involved uniformity concerns dealing with remedial
issues.90
Second, the Court distinguished between applications of maritime law that
would expand, as opposed to retract the rights of plaintiffs.9' The Court
argued that permitting state causes of action for wrongful death to supplement
the federal general maritime law was not inconsistent with Moragne at all,
because both decisions would extend relief to plaintiffs.92 This aspect of the
81. See id. at 624-25.
82. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
85. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 625-26; see also Petitioner's Brief passim, Yamaha Motor Corp. v.
Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996) (No. 94-1387), available in 1995 WL 451711.
86. Calhoun, 116S. Ct. at 625-28.
87. Id. at 626-27.
88. See supra note 27.
89. "[A] series of this Court's decisions transformed the maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness
into a strict liability rule." Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 624; see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
90. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 626 (stating that "[t]he uniformity concerns that prompted us to
overrule The Harrisburg, however, were of a different order than those invoked by Yamaha").
91. Id.at627-28.
92. Id. at 627 (stating that "Moragne, in sum, centered on the extension of relief, not on the
contraction of remedies"). The Court also noted that although the discussion in Moragne centered on
the extension of a federal right of action for wrongful death, the Court "notably left in place the
negligence claim she had stated under Florida's law." Id. at 627-28. Further, the Supreme Court
incorporated the following part of the Third Circuit's decision into their own opinion:
Moragne... showed no hostility to concurrent application of state wrongful death statutes. Indeed,
to read into Moragne the idea that it was placing a ceiling on recovery for wrongful death, rather
than a floor, is somewhat ahistorical. The Moragne cause of action was in many respects a gap-
filling measure to ensure that seamen (and their survivors) would be treated alike. The "humane
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Court's holding placed renewed emphasis on the idea that "it better becomes
the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to
withhold the remedy." 93
Third, the Court distinguished Tallentire, Higginbotham, and Miles. 4 The
Court did so by limiting them to situations where "Congress has prescribed a
comprehensive tort recovery regime to be uniformly applied."95 Thus, the
Court effectively read out of these opinions the concerns for uniformity they
had expressed.96
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Whether or not the Supreme Court's analysis in Yamaha Motor Corp. v.
Calhoun is correct, it is likely to have a profound impact on admiralty law.97
Two principles likely to be derived from this case are the demise of the
uniformity doctrine and the expansion of plaintiffs' rights in maritime
disputes.
The Supreme Court has seemingly dealt a death blow to the uniformity
doctrine.9" First the Court made an unexplained distinction between
uniformity concerns dealing with liability and uniformity concerns dealing
and liberal" purpose underlying the general maritime remedy of Moragne was driven by the idea
that survivors of seamen killed in state territorial waters should not have been barred from recovery
simply because the tort system of the particular state in which a seamen died did not incorporate
special maritime doctrines. It is difficult to see how this purpose can be taken as an intent to
preclude the operation of state laws that do supply a remedy.
Id at 627 (quoting Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 641-42) (omission by the Court).
93. Id. (citing Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. at 375, 375 (1970) (quoting The Sea
Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909,910 (C.C. D. Md. 1865) (No. 12578A)).
94. These cases came after Moragne and provided guidance as to the contours of the federal
general maritime wrongful death cause of action. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
95. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 628.
96. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
97. At least one scholar has already referred to the case as a "landmark decision." See Walker,
supra note 4, at 958.
98. This decision has already been criticized by several commentators on this ground. See, e.g.,
Randell E. Treadaway & Jean Paul P. Overton, Recoverable Damages in Maritime Personal Injury
and Death Cases: The Aftermath of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 8 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 91, 105-07
(1995) (stating that Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun "sacrificed the Miles goal of uniformity"); Otway
B. Denny Jr. & David J. Levy, What's Happening in... Advocacy, Practice and Procedure, 63 DEF.
CouNs. J. 401, 402 (1996) ("In light of Yamaha, defendants must look beyond the traditional
arguments of uniformity and federal preemption to limit the relief available."). For a more thorough
discussion of the effect of the Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun decision on the continuing validity of
the uniformity principle, see Thompson, supra note 72, at 227-39.
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with remedies." The Court proclaimed simply that those involving liability
were "intolerable," while those involving remedies were acceptable."° One
can only wonder if the Calhouns would have understood this distinction had
their damages been limited, as Yamaha argued they should have been,"0' to
merely the cost of funeral expenses. Second, the Court completely ignored the
uniformity concerns at work in Tallentire, Higginbotham, and Miles"2 and
characterized these decisions as cases where Congress had "prescribed a
comprehensive tort recovery regime to be uniformly applied."'0 3 If these
cases truly were that simple, there was no need for the uniformity discussions
that permeated them.3" Instead, these cases could have been more simply
decided on the grounds of standard preemption analysis.1
05
Additionally, the Supreme Court has signaled a return to the "liberal
character of proceedings in admiralty"'0 6 by expressing a preference for
plaintiffs' rights. This portion of the decision is against the emerging trend
spotted by the Third Circuit "that the Court seems to be cutting back on
plaintiffs' rights in maritime actions."'0 7 It is, however, in accordance with the
previous preferences of maritime law."0 8 Thus, the Supreme Court's opinion
in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun represents a denial of the importance of
uniformity concerns in maritime law and represents a shift away from the
trend the Third Circuit called a "cutting back on plaintiffs' rights in maritime
actions." In maritime law proceedings, counsel should now be wary of
relying on uniformity concerns in making their arguments and instead should
focus on the Third Circuit's explanation of preemption analysis.
CONCLUSION
In Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, the Supreme Court held that general
maritime law does not preempt state law wrongful death actions based on the
99. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 625-28; see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
100. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 627-28.
101. Yamaha contended that "the Calhouns could recover as damages only Natalie's funeral
expenses." Id. at 622.
102. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
103. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 628; see also supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 42, 50 and accompanying text.
105. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
107. Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp, 40 F.3d 622, 636 (3d Cir. 1994), ajj'd, 116 S. Ct. 619
(1996).
108. See Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. at 627.
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death of a nonseaman in territorial waters."° The Court refused to endorse the
argument that Moragne had launched a uniform federal maritime remedy for
all deaths occurring in state waters, thereby precluding all previously
available state remedies."' In so doing, the Court has seemingly abandoned
its emphasis on the concerns of uniformity, which had appeared to have
developed into a guiding principle in the interpretation of maritime law.
Additionally, the Court's limitation of its previous holdings in Tallentire,
Higginbotham, and Miles seems to impliedly embrace the Third Circuit's
standard preemption analysis as the proper replacement for the concerns of
uniformity."' Finally, the Court announced a preference for the expansion of
plaintiffs' rights." 2 Thus, the probable result of the Supreme Court's decision
in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun is the encouragement of litigation by (1)
creating more uncertainty in the maritime law by retreating from the concerns
of uniformity as a guiding principle and (2) indicating a preference for the
expansion of plaintiffs' rights."3
John Krimmel
109. Id. at 629.
110. See id. at 625 ("Yamaha argues that Moragne-despite its focus on 'maritime duties' owed to
maritime workers--covers the waters, creating a uniform federal maritime remedy for all deaths
occurring in state territorial waters, and ousting all previously available state remedies.").
111. In the Third Circuit's opinion, they framed the issue as a preemption one and stated that "the
maritime preemption doctrine is not significantly different from the preemption doctrine applicable to
non-maritime contexts." Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 629. The court went on to use a standard preemption
analysis to guide it to its decision. Although the Supreme Court's opinion talks more in terms of
uniformity, the underlying theme is one of the Third Circuit's preemption analysis. But see Thompson,
supra note 72, at 239 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court did not explicitly embrace the Third
Circuit's analysis and stating, "The Supreme Court completely avoided the preemption issues and
simply performed an historical analysis of its maritime wrongful death jurispuridence.").
112. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
113. See Thompson, supra note 72, at 236 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Yamaha
Motor Corp. v. Calhoun and stating that the Court's refusal to reconcile and synthesize its decisions
"leaves those handling maritime litigation to the task, which undoubtedly will result in more
litigation"); see also Denny & Levy, supra note 98, at 402 (stating that "fu]nder Yamaha, plaintiffs
probably will attempt to seek the application of the most generous state law remedies available to non-
seafarers.... Yamaha probably will be used by plaintiffs to argue that state law bases for liability
should supplement federal bases for injuries and deaths of non-seafarers in U.S. territorial waters.");
Paul S. Edelman, Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp.: Opposing the Decision, 20 TUL. MAR. L.J.
349, 355 (1996) (stating that Yamaha "also philosophically would support punitive damages in a
general maritime law case").
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